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INTRODUCTION
In 1955, President Eisenhower's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
pointed out that our state legislatures were the most powerful and influential instru-
ments of government in the United States when the average citizen could look
primarily to his state legislature for initiative and wisdom in the formulation of
public policy on domestic issues. Today, however, the Commission's report con-
tinued, American state legislatures are overshadowed by the governor and the
national government, primarily because the legislatures have failed to solve the more
difficult problems of our rapidly changing society. The legislature's failure to meet
these problems, the Commission argued, has been caused largely by the legislature's
unrepresentative character.'
Although urban inhabitants outnumber rural dwellers in a majority of our
states, rural voters control one or both houses of the legislature in most states. Al-
though Massachusetts probably has the most representative state legislature in the
United States, yet a majority of neither house represents a popular majority In
California, a senatorial majority represents less than twelve per cent of California's
population, while a majority in Connecticut's House comes from districts where less
than ten per cent of Connecticut's people live.3 Although New York's Legislature
may be highly representative in comparison with California's Senate or Connecticut's
House, a majority of New York's senators will represent only thirty-eight per cent of
New York's citizen population after the Reapportionment of 1963, while a majority
of New York's assemblymen will come from districts where only 36.5 per cent of
New York's citizen inhabitants live.4
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TiONMENT [in New York], 2 vols., State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision and
Simplification of the Constitution, Staff Report No. 33 (196o); Apportionment of the New York State
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WEEx.Ly REP. 170-78 (1962).
'A majority of Massachusetts state senators come from districts having 44.6% of the state's population
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Neil, Urban Representation in State Legislatures, 18 STATE Gov'T 59 (945).
' Computed by the author from citizen population statistics supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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Not only does this situation enable a minority of voters to elect a legislative
majority, but, as the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations pointed out, it has
often meant legislative neglect of urban-and especially metropolitan-problems. This
neglect of urban communities has led city governments to bypass the states and make
direct cooperative arrangements with the national government in such fields as
housing, urban renewal, airports, and civilian defense. The multiplication of national-
local relations does, of course, weaken the state's proper control over its own policies
and its authority over its own political subdivisions. The Commission correctly
pointed out that the national government is often more responsive to urban needs,
because urban interests are frequently more effectively represented in Congress
than in their own state legislatures. The same shift in population which has made
our state legislatures less representative has made the Congress more representative
of urban areas. For, unlike most state legislatures, the national House of Repre-
sentatives has been reapportioned after almost every decennial census. Moreover,
since United States Senators are elected at large, they have become increasingly
dependent on urban voters for their election to the Senate
The President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded that the
role of the states in our federal system depends on the state legislatures' being reason-
ably representative of all the people.6 Similarly, the legislature's role in state govern-
ment depends on its representing all of the people of the state. The march from
various city halls to the governor's office and to Washington is not likely to abate if
the legislature fails to use its authority to solve urban problems. Thus, the future of
the states in the American federal system and of the legislature in state government
is closely tied to the representative character of the legislature.
Legislative representation involves four closely related problems: (i) the bases
of representation, (2) apportionment, (3) districting, and (4) remedies for mal-
apportionment, gerrymandering, and failure to reapportion and redistrict.
I
THE BASES oF REP EENTATiON
The first rather obvious question relates to the basis or bases of representation.
What is or what should be the apportionment base: total population, citizens, electors,
votes, area, political subdivisions, or taxes? The literature on apportionment gen-
erally talks about two apportionment bases: population and area. The term "popu-
lation" is misleading, because it has been used to cover total population, citizen popu-
lation, electors, and votes cast. Therefore, more precise terms--"popular base" and
"representative population" or "representative inhabitants"--should be used. The
term "area," which is found throughout the literature on apportionment, is also
misleading. Although the territorial extent of certain sparsely populated districts
has been offered as a reason for deviating from the popular base in apportioning
5COMMISSION ON INTESnGovERNmENTAL RELATIONS, op. ct. supra note 1, at 38, 40.6 Ibid.
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legislators to these districts, no one has ever seriously advocated the apportionment
of legislators according to acres or square miles or any other such territorial measure.
Rather, the term "area" or "territory" is used in the literature on apportionment
to refer to the use of a political or civil subdivision as an apportionment base. The
statement that Vermont's lower house has a territorial apportionment base, for
example, actually means that each of Vermont's inhabited towns has one and only
one member regardless of population or area.
In a majority of states, representative population is the principal basis of repre-
sentation in both houses. But, in many cases, the popular base has been modified
by providing for a certain' minimum or maximum number of representatives per
county or per town. New York's Constitution, for example, guarantees at least one
assemblyman to every county except Hamilton, gives two assemblymen to certain
counties, and provides that the remaining members shall be apportioned among the
most populous counties according to citizen population. Thus, it is said that there are
two bases for apportioning assemblymen: an area base and a popular base. In 1821,
when New York's population was more evenly distributed among the several
counties, the area base did not seriously modify the popular basis of apportionment.
As cities and suburban areas have grown more rapidly than rural areas, however,
this area base has greatly limited the popular base and has increasingly favored
the rural areas.
The more sophisticated defenders of a territorial base do not invoke the sanctity
of county lines or cite mere statistics on the acreage of various counties. In New
York's 1894 Convention, for example, Henry J. Cookinham contended that the
area base should not be considered merely in terms of acreage but also in terms of
the proximity of communities to each other and the means of communication
between them.7 Benjamin S. Dean argued that the great essential of representative
government is a territorial constituency which has a well established "community of
interests, political, social, economic and business." Dean maintained that a repre-
sentative "carries with him into the legislative body the force, integrity and char-
acter of his own district." Dean thought that the question of mere numbers of
inhabitants is of "the most incidental importance" when the other conditions of
representation are fixed and well established.8
Elihu Root defended the alleged over-representation of the rural areas on similar
grounds. He argued that the more sparsely populated portions of the state have
diverse interests and, therefore, should have relatively more legislators to represent
these various interests. Although a great city may have more inhabitants, he
continued, it has a unified interest and, consequently, requires fewer legislators to
represent that interest in Albany. All of Manhattan's twelve senators represent the
same interest and the same political organization, Root argued, while twelve rural
74 REVISED RECOiu OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVaNTON OF THE SrATE OF NEw You, MAY 8,
1894 TO SEPT. 29, 1894, at 8 (igoo).
a3 id. 1156-57.
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senators represent twelve different political organizations and an even greater num-
ber of different interests?
Similarly, New York's proposed senatorial apportionment of 1935 has been
criticized on the ground that, in giving priority to population equality between
districts, the legislature failed to give the proper weight to the essential ingredients
of the area base. F. Morse Hubbard, Research Counsel to the Joint Legislative
Committee on Reapportionment, complained that territorial extent, lack of con-
venient communication, and differences in social and economic characteristics had
been ignored in grouping upstate counties into senatorial districts. He pointed out,
for example, that the proposed thirty-seventh senatorial district (Delaware, Otsego,
and Herkimer counties) was a long narrow district running north and south. Not
only would the northern and southern extremities of such a district be remote from
each other, but they are not connected by direct routes of communication since the
highways and railroads cut across these counties from east to west or from southeast
to northwest."'
In summary, the more serious arguments in favor of an area base run something
like this: The problem of providing adequate representation for Manhattan, where
there are 72,003 citizens per square mile, is quite different from that of providing
adequate representation for counties having less than a hundred citizens per square
mile. One might reasonably argue, for example, that one senator from Manhattan
can more effectively represent his 396,o7 constituents living in an area of approxi-
mately 5 square miles than is possible for a senator representing four counties such
as Fulton, Hamilton, Herkimer, and Montgomery (now district No. 41), with his
176,572 constituents living in seventy-six cities, towns, and villages spread over
4,095 square miles and separated by mountains." Similarly, for more than i8o
years, it has been argued that Staten Island's peculiar geographic position justifies
giving separate legislative representation to Staten Island whether Staten Island has
the requisite number of representative inhabitants or not.
In addition to these more sober defenders of the area base, of course, others argue
that government should always be controlled by rural citizens. In New York's 1894
Convention, for example, Edward Lauterbach pleaded for area representation on
the ground that many urbanites are "unfitted for citizenship" and that rural people
have "greater intellect."': Similarly, Henry J. Cookinham argued that the average
citizen in the rural district is superior to the average citizen of a great city-superior
in intelligence, morality, and the art of self-government. In defense of his value
judgment, Cookinham alleged that the number of criminals and political subversives
and the corruption of political machines were far greater in large cities. 3 It is often
0 3 id. 1223-34. "°N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 3, at 15-18 (1950).
"I1d. at 11, 77-78; 5 U.S. BURAu op THE CENSUS, 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS (No. r) 43-44;
N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 98, at x4 A 0953). Under the sg6o census, Manhattan (New York County)
has i,584,o69 citizen inhabitants and will receive four senators at the x963 reapportionment. See note
4 suPra.
124 REvisED REcoaRD o T E N.Y. STATE CONSTITTIONAL CoNvaNboN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 87.
"I1d. at xo-im. See also Michael J. Mulqueen's defense of urban people, nd. at 20-21, 24.
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contended that rural people are better citizens not only because they conform better
to "American ideals" but also because they are more likely to be natives of the
state. Moreover, the argument continues, the genius of the American system lies
in the defense it affords to minorities, and use of an area base gives the rural minority
protection against the voracious fiscal appetite of urban areas. Finally, apportioning
the members of at least one chamber on an area base has been defended by analogy to
the United States Senate, where each state-regardless of population-has two and
only two senators.14
In reply to these arguments, opponents of the area base contend that objective
studies show that the average rural citizen is inferior to the urban citizen in intelli-
gence, education, health, and emotional stability.'5 The virtue of democracy, the
reply continues, lies in a democratic system's ability to reflect majority opinion.
Minority rights are protected by specific constitutional guarantees, and such rights
do not-or should not-include the right of a rural voter to have his ballot equal
to two or six or more urban ballots. Although a majority of state expenditures often
go to urban areas, this argument continues, a still larger majority of state taxes are
collected in these same urban areas. Finally, it is answered, the federal analogy is
fallacious, because counties are mere creatures of the state and are not quasi-sovereign
units entitled to political equality in a federal union of counties.1 Exponents of this
position generally conclude either that the popular base should have relatively more
weight and that the area base should have relatively less importance in the apportion-
ment formula than is now the case or that the popular base should be the only base
used for apportioning the members of one or both houses.1
Like New York, a majority of American states have both a popular and a
geographic base for representation in their respective legislatures. Of the forty-
seven states having a popular base for apportioning the members of one or both
houses, thirty-three use total population as that base.' Nine state constitutions ex-
clude certain classes of inhabitants from the representative population while five
employ an even more narrow base. Minnesota's Constitution excludes only untaxed
Indians, which, in practice, means that total population is also the apportionment
base in Minnesota.j' Washington and Wisconsin exclude military personnel on
L DouoLAs S. GATLIN & BRUCE B. MAsON, REAPPORTIONMENT: ITS HISTORY IN FLORIDA (Public Admin.
Clearing House of the Univ. of Fla., Civic Information Series No. 23) 1-2 (1956).
"
5 For an example of such a study, see ELI GINZERG ET AL., THE INEFFECTIVE SOLDIER (3 vols.,
1959), based on an analysis of draft-board rejections and on case studies of thousands of American
soldiers who collapsed under the strain of active service during the Second World War. See also a popu-
lar article summarizing several such studies, Bliven, The City Boy vs. The Country Boy, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 16, 5959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 20+.
"' GATLIN & MASON, Op. cit. supra note 14, at 2. "'N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 57, at 23-24 (x957).
"
8For both houses in Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and
Wyoming; for the lower house in Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia; for the
Senate in Vermont. COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs, BOOK OF THE STATES x960-6x, at 54-58 (196O);
GORDON E. BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT AND RaDISnIuaTING Op STATE LEGISLATURES 9n (x959).
"
9 Administrative and judicial decisions have held that the phrase "Indians not taxed" means Indians
not subject to taxation and, since all Indians are now subject to some form of taxation, there are no
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active service while Alaska limits the apportionment base to civilian population-a
particularly reasonable limitation in Alaska where large numbers of service personnel
are concentrated in a few districts2 While California excludes only aliens who are
ineligible for naturalization, New York and three other states exclude all aliens
from the popular base for representation' There is good reason for excluding
aliens in any state where the ratio of aliens to total population is not approximately
the same in every county, because apportioning on the basis of total (rather than
citizen) population in such a state magnifies the electoral power of voters who
live in counties where a large number of aliens reside. In New York, however, such
an uneven distribution of aliens no longer exists so that it makes relatively little
difference whether the popular base be total or citizen population.
Similarly, if the ratio of voters to population is approximately the same in every
county, it is inconsequential whether population or voters be the popular base. But,
if electoral participation varies greatly from county to county, apportioning on the
basis of population magnifies the electoral power of voters who live in counties where
a large number of non-voters reside. This is apparently the reason for five states'
using voters rather than population as the popular base for apportioning the mem-
bers of one or both houses of their respective legislatures ' Because New York is
longer any "Indians not taxed" in the constitutional sense. MINNESOTA Lr isLATivE RasEAtcH COMMT-
TEE, LEOISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT 14n (x954).
" Alaska's upper house has what amounts to fixed apportionment. ALASKA LEGISLATrvE CoUNciL,
LEGISLATIVE DIsTRICTING AND APPORTIONMENT IN ALASKA 4-7, 15 (1956). Washington and Wisconsin
also exclude untaxed Indians-an archaic provision apparently no longer having any force. See note i9
supra. WISCONSIN LEoIsLATIvE REFERENCE LIBRARY, REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN
WIscoNsIN 4 (1954); BAKER, op. cit. supra note i8, at 17.
-" Maine excludes aliens and untaxed Indians from the senatorial apportionment base but excludes
only aliens from the apportionment base for the lower house. Nebraska excludes only aliens. Although
the Book of the States shows that New York excludes only aliens, the 1931 amendment would seem
to also exclude untaxed Indians. N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, § 4 (McKinney 1954). North Carolina excludes
both aliens and untaxed Indians. Boo oF "ar STATES, op. cit. supra note x8, at 55-56.
2 Inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base in 1953 would not have transferred a single senator
or assemblyman from one county to another. 2 RUH C. SiLVA, LyGISLATIE APPORTIONMENT (N.Y.
Temporary Commission on Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, Staff Report No. 33),
at IV-2i, IV-44-4 6 (x96o). Inclusion of aliens in the x96o apportionment base, however, would
mean one more senator for Manhattan and one less for the Upstate at the next reapportionment
It would also mean one more assemblyman for Bronx County and one less for Onondaga County
(Syracuse). The citizen percentage of the total population in z96o ranged from 93.3 in Manhattan to
99.7 in Schuyler and Yates counties while the citizen percentage of the total population was 96.8 for
the state as a whole. See note 4 supra.
" "Legal voters" for both houses of the Massachusetts Legislature; "qualified voters" for the senate
but population for the lower house in Rhode Island; "qualified voters" for both houses of the Tennessee
legislature; "qualified electors" for the Senate but population for the lower house in Texas. BooK op
THE STATES, OP. cit. supra note IS, at 55-57. Hawaii apportions members of the lower house "on
the basis of the number of voters registered at the last preceding general election . . .computed by the
method known as the method of equal proportions .. " The Hawaii Senate has fixed apportionment.
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, H. REs. No. 32, 86th Cong., ist Sess.
32-33 (x959); Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Statehood for Hawaii, S. REP. No. 8o, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. 42-43 (1959); KENNETH K. LAU, REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE
(Univ. of Hawaii Legis. Ref. Bureau Report No. 2) 15-25 (1958) and the supplement prepared by
Takaaki Izumi, id. at 1-9. The law admitting Hawaii to the Union did not modify the apportionment
provisions of the Constitution approved by the Hawaiian voters on Nov. 7, 1950. Pub. L. No. 3, 86th
Cong., ist Sess. (March x8, 1959). There seems to be little reason for Indiana's using male inhabitants
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pot one of these five states and because electoral participation varies greatly from
county to county, the weight of one popular vote cast in some counties has more
weight than one popular vote cast in certain other counties. But the use of voters
rather than citizens as the popular base would be difficult in New York because of
the difficulty in enumerating actual voters. The use of non-personal registration in
many areas means that a large number of non-voters are listed on the registration
rolls. Therefore, the use of registration as the popular base would not result in
apportioning legislators among the counties according to the number of actual
voters and would discriminate against those areas having personal registration. 5
Arizona has attempted to solve the problem of enumerating voters by basing the
apportionment of seats in its lower house on the number of votes cast for governor
at the last preceding election. While a great deal may be said in favor of using the
gubernatorial vote as the popular base for apportionment in Arizona, 0 use of such
a popular base in New York would result in inequitable apportionment; for New
York's gubernatorial elections occur in non-presidential years, and voter participation
in presidential years does not increase over that in gubernatorial years at a uniform
rate throughout the state. Apportioning legislators according to the gubernatorial
vote would underrepresent New York City in relation to the remainder of the state.
Apportioning legislators on the basis of the presidential vote, on the other hand,
would favor New York City over the upstate metropolitan areas. Therefore, if the
aim is to equalize the number of votes cast per senator and per assemblyman in New
York's seventeen most populous counties, the popular base for apportionment should
be the number of votes cast for assemblymen at the last two regular elections,
which would include one gubernatorial and one presidential year.27 Whatever popu-
lar base is used, two inter-related problems remain: (I) the relation of the popular
base to the territorial base and (2) the apportionment methods or formulae employed.
II
APPORTIONMENT
A systematic investigation of legislative representation requires one to make a
distinction between apportionment and districting. Apportionment relates to the
over twenty-one as the popular base since this includes some non-voters while it excludes approximately
half of the state's actual electorate.
"' See, for example, the comments of Elon R. Brown, William C. Osborn, William D. Dickey, and
Stephen S. Blake, 3 REVISED RECORD op TmlE N.Y. CONSTrXturIONAL CONVENrTION, Op. cit. supra note 7, at
1022-23, 1042-43, 115o, and 1179, respectively. In the four senatorial elections held under the present
apportionment (1954-6o), the average number of voters per hundred citizens ranged from 20.5 in the
eleventh senatorial district (part of Brooklyn) to 86.1 in the third senatorial district (part of Nassau
County). As a result, one popular vote cast for senator in Manhattan and Brooklyn had 1.8 times the
weight of one popular vote cast for senator in Nassau County. Computed by the author on the basis of
election statistics published in various editions of the New York Legislative Manual.
25 2 SILVA, op. cit. supra note .22, at IV-22-2 4 . " Baker, op. cit. supra note 18, at I -1 2.
272 SILVA, op. cit. supra note 22, at IV-2 4 -3 r. The seventeen most populous counties are the five in
New York City (Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond), the three New York City suburban
counties (Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester), and Albany, Niagara, Oneida, Dutchess, Orange, Erie
(Buffalo), Monroe (Rochester), Onondaga (Syracuse), and Broome (Binghamton).
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distribution of legislators among the several counties or among the various areas
of the state, while districting is concerned with the redrafting of district lines. In the
case of assembly representation, New York's Constitution makes a sharp distinction
between apportioning and districting by vesting the two functions in different bodies.
The legislature has the sole power to apportion assemblymen, but the local authori-
ties have the exclusive power to divide their respective counties into assembly
districts.2" In the case of the New York Senate, however, the legislature has the
power not only to apportion but also to district. Indeed, apportionment and
districting are inseparably joined in the method prescribed for distributing senators
to the less populous areas of the state."
Since some of New York's senatorial districts consist of two or more counties,3"
many of the problems relating to senatorial representation in New York are district-
ing rather than apportionment problems. Two extremely important apportionment
problems are involved, however, in New York's senatorial representation: (i) the
formula for apportioning senators to the more populous areas and (2) the size of the
senate.
The first step in apportioning the New York Senate is to find the ratio, which
the constitution stipulates shall be obtained by dividing the state's total number
of citizen inhabitants by fifty.31 The census of 196o shows a total citizen popula-
tion of i6,24o,786, so that the ratio will be 324,816. The next step is to apportion
one senator for each full ratio to each county that has at least six per cent of the
state's citizen population. When this is done in 1963, twenty-six senators will be
apportioned to six counties having a total of 9,519,316 citizen inhabitants :32
"' Each county is entitled to at least one assemblyman. A county having only one assemblyman
constitutes one assembly district by itself and, therefore, cannot be divided into assembly districts. 'In
any county entitled to more than one member, the board of supervisors, and in any city embracing an
entire county and having no board of supervisors, the common council, or if there be none, the body
exercising the powers of a common council, shall ...divide such counties into assembly districts...."
N.Y. CONsr. art. III, § 5 (1894).
" The New York legislature actually performs four functions in senatorial apportionment and
districting: (i) apportions senators to each county that has at least 6%' of the state's total citizen popu-
lation; (2) divides each of these counties into a number of senatorial districts equal to the number of
senators to which that county is entitled; (3) determines the total number of senators to be apportioned;
(4) divides the remainder of the state into a number of senatorial districts equal to the number of
senators yet to be apportioned. The first and third are essentially apportionment functions. The second
involves only districting. The fourth function involves both apportionment and districting, because
the legislature apportions senators to the less populous areas of the state by dividing these areas into
senatorial districts.
0 Seven states give one and only one senator to each county and, thereby, have no popular base
for senatorial apportionment: Idaho, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and South
Carolina. The Maryland Constitution does, however, allow the city of Baltimore to have six senators.
Nine other states have no real popular base because they have what amounts to fixed apportionment
which, in most cases, can be altered only by constitutional amendment: for Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas,
Hawaii, Illinois, and Michigan senates; for both houses in Delaware and Mississippi; and for the lower
house in Vermont. BooK oF THE STATEs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 54-57.
"
1 N.Y. CONsr. art. 11, § 4 (1894). See note 4 supra.








In order to limit the senatorial representation of Manhattan (New York County)
and Brooklyn (Kings County)," the constitution requires the legislature to follow
three mandatory rules in apportioning senators to these six most populous counties:
(i) No county shall have four or more senators unless it shall have a full ratio for
each senator. (2) No county shall have more than one-third of all the senators. (3)
No two counties or the territory thereof as organized in i894, which are adjoining
counties, or which are separated only by public waters, shall have more than one-
half of all the senators." The second and third rules have never been applicable,
and population trends indicate that there never will be occasion to apply them.
The first rule, however, has operated not only against New York and Kings counties
but also against Bronx, Erie, Nassau, Westchester, and Queens, and has been one of
the two major causes for the Senate's unrepresentative character.
The second major cause for the New York Senate's unrepresentative character
is the provision for enlarging the Senate. After apportioning senators to the six
counties that each have three or more ratios, the Legislature must determine the
size of the Senate. The New York Constitution provides:35
... The senate shall always be composed of fifty members, except that if any county
having three or more senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on such
ratio to an additional senator or senators, such additional senator or senators shall be given
to such county in addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number of senators shall
be increased to that extent.
Although there has been a great deal of controversy about the meaning of this
constitutional provision," it seems to be established that the number of "additional
"Eleven other states also place a maximum on the representation of the more populous counties or
towns. Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, and Texas allow no county to have more than
one senator. The Pennsylvania Constitution allows no city or county to have more than one-sixth of
the whole number of senators-a limitation which the Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional
Revision recommends be excised, REPoRT 9o-9 (1959). The Maine Constitution permits no county
to have more than five senators and no town to have more than seven members of the lower house.
Rhode Island sets the maxima per city or town at six senators and one quarter of the whole number
of representatives. Oklahoma permits no county to have more than seven representatives. Although the
Maryland Constitution allows the city of Baltimore to have thirty-six representatives, no other county
may have more than six. BooK oF THE STATEs, op. cit. supra note x8, at 54-58. See note 30 supra.
"'N.Y. CoNST. art. III, § 4 (1894). The court of appeals also laid down four mandatory and
three directive rules for districting, Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 2o5, 81 N.E. 124, X29 (19o7).
"sN.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1894).
s SiLvA, op. Cit. supra note 22, at 11-29-47. Oklahoma appears to be the only other state
which has a similar provision: "The Senate shall always be composed of forty-four senators, except that
in the event any county shall be entitled to three or more senators at the time of any apportionment
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senators" shall be determined by comparing the number of senators to which each
of the most populous counties is entitled under the.new apportionment with the
number apportioned to it in 1894?' This means that the total number of senators
under the apportionment of 1963 will be fifty-seven:
Number of Senators Number of Senators
All counties now having three apportioned by according to Additional
or more full ratios Convention of 1894 census of 1960 Senators
New York ................... 12 f4l -
Bronx f .4f
Erie .......................... 3 3 0
Kings ....................... 7 7 0
Nassaul ..................... ...... 1.. . . +7
Queensf ............ _____+ __
Additional Senators +7
Basic number of Senators 50
Total number of Senators 57
Since no reduction in the total number of senators results from New York
County's loss of four senators, 8 these four senators are transferred to the Upstate
while the Senate is enlarged to provide representation for New York City's rapidly
growing suburban areas.
The third step in apportioning New York's senators will be the distribution of
thirty-one senators to the remaining counties that have only 6,72i,47o citizen in-
habitants. This means that the citizen population per senator in these less populous
counties will be only 216,822, while the citizen population per senator in the six
most populous counties will range from 342,052 in New York City's Bronx County to
425,267 in suburban Nassau County. When the Legislature conforms to the district-
ing rules that are also commanded by the constitution, the range will be even
such additional senator or senators shall be given such county in addition to the forty-four senators and
the whole number [of senators] shall be increased to that extent." Osu..A. CoNsr. art. V, § 9a (1907).
(Emphasis and bracketed words supplied.) Use of the word entitled rather than having clarifies which
counties are subject to this provision. It is not clear, however, which senators are to be considered "addi-
tional senators." If the clause means in addition to forty-four apportioned in 1907, the x950 census
would have produced a senate of fifty-four members. If this clause means in addition to three senators,
however, then a senate of only forty-nine could have been justified. If the University of Oklahoma's
Bureau of Government Research is correct in saying that this clause means in addition to the maximum
of two senators apportioned to a county in 1907, then a senate of fifty-one members would have been
proper under the census of 195o. Since the Oklahoma Senate has never been reapportioned, 'the state still
has forty-four senators, and this provision has been neither applied nor subject to judicial interpretation.
BUREAU OF Gov'T RESEARCH, LEGIsI.ATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN OKLAHOMsA 8, 10, 12-13, 27-28 (1956).
"in re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 213, 52 N.E.2d 97, 101 (1943); N.Y. LEGIs. Doe. No. 98, at 7-8 (i953)-
"
5 Neither Bronx nor Nassau counties existed in 1894, but it has been held that Queens and Nassau
should be considered as having been a single county in 1894 while New York and Bronx should be
lumped together as one county for determining the number of additional senators. In re Fay, 29z N.Y.
198, 212, 52 N.E.2d 97, 101 (1943); N.Y. LEGIs. Doc. No. 57, at 12 (1942).
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greater-probably from x66,715 citizen inhabitants in the Essex-Saratoga-Warren
(now the thirty-ninth) district to approximately 426,oo in Nassau's most populous
senatorial district. 9
The range will be even greater in the case of assembly districts-from X4,974
citizen inhabitants in Schuyler County to approximately 216,ooo in Suffolk County,
a suburb of New York City. The constitution sets the size of the Assembly at xo
members and provides that the ratio for apportioning assemblymen shall be de-
termined by dividing the state's total citizen population by this number. The
constitution also divides the state's sixty-one counties (with Fulton and Hamilton
treated as one county) into three classes: (i) those having less than one per cent of
the state's citizen population, (2) those having from one to i% per cent of the state's
citizen population, and (3) those having more than i% per cent. The first step in
apportioning assemblymen is to assign one assemblyman to each of the forty-four
counties in the first class. Two assemblymen will then be assigned to each of the
seventeen other counties. This will leave seventy-two assemblymen to be apportioned
among the fourteen third-class counties, and this will be done roughly according to
citizen population.o
The application of this constitutional procedure in 1963 will mean that forty-four
seats will be assigned-not apportioned, but assigned-to the forty-four least populous
counties, which have a total citizen population of only 2,761,656 or 62,765 citizen
inhabitants per assemblyman. Six seats will be assigned to the three intermediate
counties with 93,478 citizen inhabitants per assemblyman. The remaining one
hundred seats will be apportioned to the fourteen most populous counties, which
have a total citizen population of I2,918,265 or i29,i83 citizen inhabitants per
assemblyman.41
A combination of two factors makes the New York Assembly even less repre-
sentative of the popular base than the New York Senate is-the guarantee of at
least one assemblyman to each county while the total number of assemblymen is
frozen at 150. This arrangement would not seriously violate the popular principle
if New York's representative population were more evenly distributed among
the various counties. But, with thirty-eight of the sixty-one counties below the ratio,
thirty-eight assemblymen must be assigned wholly on the territorial base without
regard to the popular base. With a total of only 15o assemblymen, this leaves only
seventy-five per cent of the assemblymen to be distributed among twenty-three
counties that contain eighty-eight per cent of the state's citizen population-and only
sixty-seven per cent of the assemblymen to be distributed among the fourteen most
populous counties that have almost eighty per cent of the state's citizen population.' 2
As is true of one or both legislative chambers in a majority of the states, the New
"' See note 4 supra.
"N.Y. CoxsT. art. IU, § 5 (1894); I SiLVA, op. cit. supra note 22, at III-i9-63.
"1 See note 4 supra. The three second-class counties are Broome, Dutchess, and Orange. The other
counties listed in note 27 supra, are the fourteen most populous (third-class) counties.
42 See note 4 supra.
LEoIsLATIvE REPRESENTATION
York Assembly can be made to reflect the popular base in one of three ways:
(x) reduction of the number of counties, (2) abolition of the rule that guarantees
separate assembly representation to each county,43 or (3) increasing the total number
of assemblymen so that more assemblymen can be apportioned to the more populous
counties.
Since neither a reduction in the number of counties nor the combination of two
or more counties into one assembly district is politically feasible in New York, the
New York Assembly can actually be made to reflect the popular base more accurately
only by enlarging the Assembly. While an assembly of more than one thousand
members would be required to bring every one of New York's counties above the
ratio, a relatively equitable apportionment could be made on the basis of only two
hundred assemblymen44 if a mathematically sound method were used to apportion
these two hundred seats to the several counties.4 5
Contrary to the popular notion, not all unequal representation is caused by
gerrymandering. Use of an area base--such as the New York Constitution's
guarantee of at least one assemblyman to each county, for example-is not gerry-
mandering but results in districts that are unequal in population. Similarly, New
York's constitutional provisions for senatorial apportionment result in unequal
representation and may be called "misapportionment." Yet, since this apportionment
of senators involves no abuse of legislative discretion, it is neither "malapportion-
ment" nor "gerrymandering." Abuse of legislative discretion in apportioning
legislators in order to give unfair advantage to an area or to a political party is "mal-
apportionment" while "gerrymander" refers to the abuse of discretion in drawing the
boundaries of legislative districts.
' Thirty states guarantee the least populous counties a certain minimum representation in one or
both houses of their respective legislatures: At least one representative in each house is guaranteed to
each county (or town) in Connecticut, Idaho, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Wyoming. At least one senator is guaranteed to each county (or town) in Maine, Mon-
tana, and Nevada. Each county (or town) is guaranteed at least one representative in the lower house
of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma (in practice), Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia. Arizona
guarantees that no county shall have fewer representatives in the lower house than it would have if
representatives were apportioned on the basis of the 193o gubernatorial vote. Kentucky allows no more
than two counties to be joined into one legislative district for the lower house. Maryland gives one
senator and guarantees at least two members of the lower house to each county and to each of the six
districts of Baltimore City. BooK oi THE STATEs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 54-58. The Mississippi
Constitution also divides the state's several counties into three groups--'Three Great Divisions"-and
guarantees each group that it shall have a certain proportion of the representation in the senate and in
the lower house regardless of changes in population. EDwARD H. HoBBs, LEoisLATivE AppoTioNmENr
IN Mississippi 6, 13-17, 49-58, 6i, 82-85 (1956). See notes 30 and 33 supra.
A x SILVA, Op. cit. supra note 22, at 111-63-76.
"The so-called "Brown formula," which is used to distribute "remaining members" among the
most populous counties certainly is not a mathematically sound formula although it has received judicial
approval. Matter of Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 59, 113 N.E. 545, 549 (916) (dictum). One of the im-
pediments to use of a more sound formula appears to he the inability of the legislators to understand the
arithmetic involved in using a better formula. r SILvA, op. cit. supra note 22, at m-3o-6 3 . For a dis-
cussion of the two best modern methods of apportionment, "major fractions" and "equal proportions,"
see Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, 17 LAw & CoNTarP. PROB. 290 (1952);
Schmeckebier, The Method of Equal Proportions, id. at 302.
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III
Ds RCTNG
A "gerrymander" may be defined as "the formation of election districts, on
another basis than that of single and homogeneous political units as they existed
previous to the . . . [districting or redistricting], with boundaries arranged for
partisan advantage."46  Thus, gerrymandering involves the creation of artificial
districts with arbitrary boundaries, which are consciously drawn for partisan ad-
vantage. There are two methods of gerrymandering: (I) spreading the opposition
party's vote among the various districts so that the opposition can carry few, if any,
districts; (2) concentrating the opposition party's vote in a few districts so that
the opposition's popular support will be dissipated in the form of large electoral
margins in these few districts.47 Gerrymandering seems always to have offended
the average citizen's sense of fairness and political morality. Consequently, most
state constitutions now contain certain districting rules, which were designed to
prevent or restrict gerrymandering.
New York's Constitution contains seven such rules that the legislature is to
follow in drawing the boundaries of senatorial districts.48 The constitution also
lays down ten districting rules that were designed to prevent the local authorities
from gerrymandering assembly districts.40 These rules may or may not have re-
"'ELMER C. GiuFFrrH, THE RIsE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 21 (907). Although
the term gerrymander was coined in Massachusetts in the spring of x8x2, the practice of gerrymandering
appears to have been devised by William Penn in 1705, when he separated the city of Philadelphia from
its county and thereby enhanced the influence of the rural districts. Id. at 26-29, 120-121. But, as
Griffith noted, Pennsylvania was also the first state to adopt constitutional provisions designed to restrict
gerrymandering. Id. at 44-46, 121.
"'1d. at 15-21.
"The rules are as follows: (i) Each district shall consist of contiguous territory. (2) No county
shall be divided in the formation of a senatorial district except to make two or more senatorial districts
wholly in such county. (3) No town, except a town having more than 2% of the state's citizen popula-
tion, and no city block enclosed by streets or public ways shall be divided in the formation of senatorial
districts. (4) No senatorial district shall contain a greater excess of population over an adjoining district
in the same county than the population of a town or block therein adjoining such district. (5) Each
senatorial district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of citizen inhabitants. (6) Each
senatorial district shall be in as compact form as practicable. (7) Counties, towns or blocks which, from
their location, may be included in either of two districts, shall be so placed as to equalize the number
of citizen inhabitants in the two districts. N.Y. CONsr. art. III, § 4 (1894, as amended in 1945).
"'The rules are as follows: (i) The number of assembly districts in a county shall be equal to the
number of assemblymen to which that county is entitled-that is, a multi-member county shall be
divided into single-member districts. (2) Each assembly district shall consist of contiguous territory.
(3) Each assembly district shall be wholly within the same senatorial district. (4) In a county having
more than one senatorial district, the same number of assembly districts shall be placed in each sena-
torial district, unless the assembly district can not be evenly divided among the county's senatorial
districts, in which case one more assembly district shall be placed in such county's most populous
senatorial district, or one less assembly district shall be put in that county's least populous senatorial
district. Populous, of course, is to be measured in terms of citizen population. (5) No town, except
a town having more than i% of the state's citizen population, and no city block enclosed by streets or
public ways shall be divided in the formation of assembly districts. (6) No assembly district shall
contain a greater excess of population over an adjoining assembly district in the same senatorial
district than the populatioi of a town or block therein adjoining such assembly district. (7) Towns or
blocks which, from their location, may be included in either of two assembly districts shall be so placed
as to equalize the number of citizen inhabitants in the two districts. (8) Each assembly district in the
same county shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of citizen inhabitants. (9) Each
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stricted the gerrymander, but the most casual inspection of a senatorial district map
or of an assembly district map suggests that gerrymandering is still a well developed
art in the state of New York, while a comparison of election returns-from adjacent
legislative districts confirms this suspicion. Moreover, in actual cases, these rules
often not only conflict with each other50 but also compel the Legislature and local
agencies to create districts that are unequal in population.
The New York Constitution provides that senatorial districts shall be composed
of contiguous territory and that no county shall be divided in the formation of
senatorial districts except to form two or more districts wholly in the same county.
These two rules have created a real problem in dealing with Staten Island (Rich-
mond County). According to the State Enumeration of 19o5, each of the state's
senatorial districts should have had approximately 140,000 citizen inhabitants, but
Richmond had only 66,44. New York and Kings counties were the only counties
which, by any stretch of the imagination, could be considered as "contiguous" to
Richmond. New York County was entitled to twelve senators and had a surplus
of io5,i72 citizen inhabitants while Kings County was entitled to eight senators
with a surplus citizen population of 48,702. The obvious solution would seem to
be the creation of a senatorial district composed of Richmond and the southwest
corner of Kings and/or New York counties. But, since the county rule made
this solution unconstitutional, the Legislature joined Richmond with the non-
contiguous County of Queens in the second senatorial district, which had a total
citizen population of 246,187. In Sherrill v. O'Brien, °a the court of appeals in-
validated the Act of 19o6 on the ground that there was an unconstitutional popula-
tion differential of 109,012 between this district and the first district (Nassau and
Suffolk counties), which had only 137,175 citizen inhabitants. The court also ruled
that Richmond could not constitutionally be joined with Queens, since Queens was
entitled to a senator without RichmondV1
The Legislature solved the Richmond problem by joining Richmond in a senatorial
district with Rockland County. The most direct routes of travel from the southern to
the northern part of this district-from Richmond to Rockland-ran through New
Jersey or through New York and Bronx and Westchester counties, but the Rich-
mond-Rockland district remained until x943, when Richmond was given its own
senator although Richmond had from 84,ooo to i37,ooo fewer citizen inhabitants
than New York City's other senatorial districts had. One might ask why the court
assembly district shall consist of convenient territory. (io) Each assembly district shall be as compact as
practicable. N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, § 5 (1894, as amended in 1945). The first six rules appear to be
mandatory while the last four seem to be merely directive.
" The court of appeals has said that the first four rules listed in note 48, supra, are mandatory,
while the other three are merely directive. A mandatory rule takes precedence over a directive rule,
but the districting agency has discretion in choosing the rule to be followed when two mandatory or
two directive rules conflict. Sherrill v. O'Brien, x88 N.Y. 185, 205, 8i N.E. 124, 129 (907). See also
note 49 sUpra.
"a Supra note 5o.
'Queens citizen population= 79,746. The court also held that the thirteenth district in New
York County was not "in as compact form as practicable." z88 N.Y. 1s8, 81 NE. .24 (1907).
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of appeals gave precedence to the county rule of 1894 over the contiguity rule, which
dates back to 1821. Why should this county rule take precedence over the venerable
rule of 1777 relating to population equality?52 Moreover, what sense of locality or
what community of interest did Richmond and Rockland counties have? Is Rock-
land, like Richmond, a part of New York City? Are county boundaries a more
important part of the territorial base than are locality, contiguity, and common
interest?
The so-called Richmond problem is not the only one presented by the county
rule. Suffolk County, for example, is out on the tip of Long Island and is con-
tiguous only to Nassau County. The Acts of 19o6, i9o7, 1916, and 1917 joined these
two counties into one senatorial district. The census of i93o, however, showed
that Nassau was entitled to its own senator without Suffolk and had over 83,000
surplus citizen inhabitants. While each senatorial district should have had approxi-
mately 189,6oo citizen inhabitants, Suffolk had only 145,841. The obvious solution
would have been the formation of a senatorial district composed of Suffolk and
the eastern end of Nassau. But, since the county rule forbids this solution, the Legis-
lature proposed to give Suffolk and Nassau one senator each, although there was a
population differential of 126,773 between the two counties. There simply was no
constitutional alternativeP
The county rule produces large population differentials not only between the
metropolitan districts and between the suburban districts but also between the multi-
county districts upstate. It is virtually impossible, for example, to reduce the popu-
lation differential (I44,992) between the thirty-third and the thirty-ninth senatorial
districts,54 because the county rule requires that an entire county be added to or
removed from a district. The rule does not permit reducing the population of the
thirty-third by adding part of Orange County to the thirty-fourth or the thirty-
fifth district. Nor does it permit adding parts of Rockland County to the thirtieth
and thirty-first districts. Similarly, the population of the thirty-ninth could not be
increased by adding a part of one or several adjoining counties to the district. The
thirty-ninth district could be enlarged only by adding an entire county to the
district-and the addition of an entire county would create still greater population
inequalities between the several districts.
Not only has treating the county as a unit produced great population inequalities
between senatorial districts, but it has produced even greater population inequalities
between assembly districts. According to the 196o census, for example, only 14,974
citizens live in the least populous assembly district while the state-wide average
is io8,272 citizens per assemblyman. 5  There is no reason to burden the reader
"2 See notes 48 and 50 supra.
"
3 New York State Legislature, Executive Session of the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportion-
ment, March 13, 1935, pp. ao-ii.
"Thirty-third (Orange and Rockland) = 311,707; thirty-ninth (Essex, Saratoga, and Warren)
- 166,715. See note 4 supra.
"' See note 4 supra.
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with a longer catalog of examples of problems created by the constitutional rules
that require the county to be treated as a unit in providing legislative representation
in New York. The illustrative cases presented are sufficient to indicate the type of
problem caused by the so-called county rules in a majority of the fifty states.
It should not be implied that the county rules are the only rules that make it
constitutionally impossible in New York to create legislative districts having an
equal number of citizen inhabitants. The original Constitution of 1894 provided that
no town could be divided in the formation of senate or assembly districts. This
town rule created a problem in x943, for example, when Nassau County was appor-
tioned four assemblymen but had only three towns, one of which contained almost
sixty-five per cent of the county's citizen population. In 1943, the Nassau County
Board divided the county into four assembly districts that ranged in citizen popula-
tion from 50,362 to i27,98o. This districting ordinance was declared unconstitutional
on the ground that the entire town of Hempstead had not been placed in one
district.5 6 In 1944, the County Board redistricted to comply with the court's ruling.
The reconstituted districts, however, ranged from 8,42z to 247,243 citizen inhabi-
tants :57
First. Town of Hempstead ................................. 247,243
Second. City of Long Beach .................................. 8,422
Third. Town of North Hempstead .......................... 77,239
Fourth. Town of Oyster Bay & City of Glen Cove ............ 50,362
Nassau County .... 383,266
The contiguity rule precluded the joining of Long Beach with any city or town
other than Hemsptead, which already was the most populous of the four districts.
Consequently, there seemed to be no alternative to making Long Beach an assembly
district by itself. The only possible way of equalizing the population of the four
districts involved an unconstitutional division of Hempstead among at least three
districts and the splitting of North Hempstead or Oyster Bay between at least two
districts.
In 1945, the voters adopted a constitutional amendment that permits the division
of a town if that town has at least one per cent of the state's total citizen population.P8
Since Hemptsead was the only town in Nassau with at least 124,014 citizen in-
habitants,r9 only Hempstead could be divided in the formation of assembly districts.
Therefore, even after the 1943 districts were re-established following adoption of the
S In re Tishman, 293 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E.2d 858 (1944).
5 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1944, at 899.
8 "No town, except a town having more than a ratio of apportionment and one-half over ... shall
be divided in the formation of assembly districts .. " Since one assembly ratio equals I/rsoth of the
state's total citizen population, I / ratios is z% of the state's citizen population. The amendment also
authorized the division of a town between senatorial districts if that town's citizen population amounts
to at least one ratio. Since a senate ratio equals the state's citizen population divided by fifty, one ratio
is 2% of the state's citizen population. N.Y. CONST. art. II, §§ 4-5 (1894, as amended in X945).
5' One per cent of 12,401,329 = 124,013.29 = I V/ ratios. N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 57, at 51 (1942).
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1945 constitutional amendment, the disparity between Nassau's most populous and
least populous assembly districts still amounted to 77,618 citizen inhabitants: 0
First. Part of Hempstead ................................... 127,685
Second. Long Beach & remainder of Hempstead ............... 127,980
Third. North Hempstead .................................... 77,239
Fourth. Oyster Bay & Glen Cove ............................. 50,362
Nassau County .... 383,266
Nor did the i95o census permit the Nassau County Board to adhere to all of the
various districting rules prescribed by the constitution without creating assembly
districts that ranged from 81,36I to 137,201 citizen inhabitants.61
Perhaps the Nassau County Board could have created districts that were more
nearly equal in population if the contiguity and town rules had not been confounded
by the rule that requires all of an assembly district to be placed in the same sena-
torial district. While a combination of these three rules produced a population
differential of 55,840 between Nassau's most populous and least populous districts,
the senatorial district rule alone often produces even greater inequalities between
assembly districts in counties entitled to a number of assemblymen that cannot be
evenly divided among that county's senatorial districts. In such a case, the constitu-
tion requires one more assembly district to be placed in the county's most populous
senatorial district or one less assembly district to be placed in the county's least
populous senatorial district.
Monroe County, which contains the city of Rochester, for example, will receive
three senators and five assemblymen under the apportionment of 1963. Since the
constitution requires an assembly district to lie wholly in one senatorial district,
one assemblyman must be elected in Monroe's least populous senatorial district while
each of Monroe's other two senatorial districts must be divided into two assembly
districts. Since Monroe's three senatorial districts must each have approximately
the same number of cidizen inhabitants, one of Monroe's assemblymen will have
approximately twice as many constituents as each of the other four will have. And
this rule, which precludes an assembly district from being split between two
senatorial districts will be responsible for similar population inequalities between
assembly districts in Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, Queens, and Suffolk counties as
well as in Monroe County. 2
Adherence to the districting rules discussed in the Richmond, Nassau, Monroe,
and similar cases must necessarily result in population inequalities between legis-
lative districts. Although somewhat smaller, population inequalities are also
made inevitable by New York's constitutional barrier against dividing any city
!'N.Y. LEGIs. MANUAL 907-09 (1946).
" The fourth district = 81,361; the third = 137,201. Statistics supplied by Mr. C. Burr Reed, former
chief clerk to the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment.
. 'See Table I.
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TABLE I
ASSEMBLY DIsTRIcTs IN ALL COUNTIES ENTITLED TO Two oR MoRE SENATE DZsrncTS
UNDER CITIZEN CENSUS O 196o
Total Total Number of As- Approximate 1960
Number of Number of Number of sembly Districts in Citizen Population
County Senate Assembly Senate Each Senate in Each Assembly
Districts Districts* Districts District Districtb
Bronx .......... 4 10 - - 136,821
2 3 114,017
2 2 171,026
Erie ............ 3 8 - - 129,956
2 3 115,516
1 2 173,275
Hings .......... 7 19 - - 132,553
5 3 119,929
2 2 179,894
Monroe ......... 3 5 - - 114,206
2 2 95,172
1 1 190,343
Nassau ......... 3 10 - - 127,580
2 3 141,756
1 4 106,317
New York ...... 4 12 4 3 132,006
Onondaga ....... 20 4 2 2 103,693
Queens ......... 5 13 - - 133,314
3 3 115,539
2 2 173,308
Suffolk ......... 30 - - 130,022
2 2 108,352
1 1 216,704
Westchester ..... 6 3 2 130,363
* Apportioned according to the Brown formula. N.Y. Izoar. Doe. No. 98, at 11-12 (1953); Matter of Dowling 219 N.Y. 44, 59
bData en 1960 citizen population supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
o Since 1994 it has been the practice is each of the five apportionments (excluding thce of 1906 and 1916 which were held invalid) to
'va an additional senator for a major fraction ofa second ratio. N.Y. Lmeos. Doc. No. 31, at 77-91 (1950); id. No. 98 at 14A-14B (1953).
onder he fve apportionments from the time single-member districts were first adopted in 1846 until 1894. it was the practice to give
an additional senator for every major fraction of a constitutional ratio-the one and only ratio under the Constitution of 1846. 3
LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL BISTORY OF NEW YORK 182-90 (1906); N.Y. Lzocs. Doc. No. 31, at 92-101 (1950).
block between two senatorial or between two assembly districts. The constitution
does, however, attempt to limit the magnitude of these population disparities in the
most populous counties by providing that no senatorial district shall contain a greater
excess of population over an adjoining district in the same county than the population
of a town or city block therein adjoining such districts. The constitution also
provides that counties, towns or blocks which, from their location, may be included
in either of two senatorial districts shall be placed to equalize the number of citizen
inhabitants in the two districts. The constitution places similar limitations on the
population disparity between two adjoining assembly districts that lie in the same
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county and in the same senatorial district.as Yet, these limitations do not prevent
some of the most serious population inequalities between districts.
The limitations relating to senatorial districts apply only to adjoining districts in
the same county. They will not prevent creation of the Essex-Saratoga-Warren
district with only 166,715 citizens while a Nassau district will have 425,267 citizens.0
Similarly, the limitations relating to assembly districts apply only to those that lie
in both the same county and the same senatorial district. It will not prevent one
of Monroe's assembly districts from being approximately twice as populous as any
one of Monroe's other four. It will not prevent Schuyler County from having its
own assembly district with only x4,974 citizen inhabitants while one of Suffolk
County's will have approximately 216,704 citizen inhabitants.6
Since New York's districting rules have prevented neither gerrymandering nor
population inequalities between legislative districts and have, indeed, caused some
of these inequalities, perhaps New York's legislators and constitution makers should
look for substitutes for these districting rules-substitutes that might actually reduce
gerrymandering without requiring the population disparities that adherence to the
present rules produces."6 Although alternatives to New York's present districting
rules are beyond the scope of this article, it still may be in order to suggest that
sataisfactory alternatives will not be found in the constitutions of the forty-nine other
states. For the districting rules of the other states are similar to-and, in many
cases, identical to-New York's.
IV
JuDiciAL REMEDms
The New York Constitution specifically provides that any apportionment statute
or districting ordinance "shall be subject to review by the supreme court, at the
suit of any citizen, under such reasonable regulations as the legislature may pre-
scribe." 7 In the absence of legislative regulation for judicial review of such cases, a
court has jurisdiction to proceed according to usage adopted in similar cases." The
constitution also directs any court before which an apportionment or districting
case may be pending to give precedence to that case over all other causes and pro-
ceedings and, if the said court be not in session, to convene promptly for the dis-
"' See notes 48, 49, and 50 supra. " See note 4 supra.
"
5 See Table I and note 4 supra.
"'For a discussion of such alternatives, see i SiLvA, op. cit. supra note 22, at 1-24-29; 2 id. at
V-8-r , V-3 3 -34.
"'N.Y. CoNs'r. art. III, 5 5 (1894). There has been some question about what are "reasonable regu-
latsons." In 59x8, for example, the Legislature passed a bill (Int. No. 324, Print No. 646) which provided
that such a proceeding must start within six months after an apportionment act is passed and that such
a statute must be challenged within thirty days after it becomes operative. Governor Whitman vetoed
the bill on the ground that the thirty-day provision was not a "reasonable regulation" and, therefore, was
unconstitutional. STATE OF Naw YORu, THE PuBLIC PAPERs OF GOVERNOR CHARLES SEYIOUa WVHITMAN
1gS, at 99-ioo (i959).
" People ex rel. Smith v. St. Lawrence County Board of Supervisors, 148 N.Y. 187, 42 N.E. 592
(1896).
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position of such cases.69 As a matter of history, New York's highest court has
invalidated two so-called apportionment statutes70 and several districting ordinances,"1
all on the ground that certain mandatory districting rules had been violated in the
formation of legislative districts. The courts of other states have also occasionally in-
validated apportionment and districting acts that conflicted with their respective
state constitutions 2 When state courts have nullified an apportionment or dis-
tricting act, they have usually used mandamus73 or injunction74 to order ministerial
officers to refrain from carrying out the provisions of the invalid statute.
Although state courts have occasionally invalidated a recent apportionment or
districting act, they have generally taken jurisdiction in apportionment and dis-
tricting cases only when the challenged statute has not yet been used as the basis of
an election 5 Similarly, state courts have consistently refused to invalidate the
statute in cases where the statute was valid when enacted but has become unfair only
through a shift of population and a failure to reapportion and redistrict76
Although most state constitutions require decennial reapportionment and
redistricting, failure to reapportion and redistrict is the major cause for the un-
representative character of state legislatures in the United States.7 7  While such
legislative inaction is not a cause for the New York Legislature's unrepresentative
"N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1894)-
"°Act of I9o6, Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Act of 1916, Matter of
Dowling, 2I9 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
71For example: In re Tishman, 293 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E.2d 858 (1944); People ex tel. Baird v. Board
of Supervisors of Kings County, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893). The court has been reluctant, how-
ever, to enforce mere directive rules (note 49 supra) and has held that the burden of proving un-
constitutionality rests with the petitioner who challenges the ordinance. In re Richardson, 307 N.Y.
269, 12r N.E.ad 217 (1954).
"'For example: Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932); Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239
Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d 315 (1931); Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass.
55, 113 N.E. 740 (1916); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); Giddings v. Blacker,
93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892); State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (x892); id., 83
Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892). See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1337-39 (1919).
"
3 For example: State v. Scott, 56 S.D. 114, 227 N.W. 572 (1929); Donovan v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, X13 N.E. 740 (1916); State ex rel. Harte v. Moorehead, 99
Neb. 527, x56 N.W. 1o67 (1916); People ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors of Kings County,
X38 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893); State ex rel. Morris v. Wrightson, 56 N.J.L. 126, 28 At. 56 (x893);
Kiddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892).
"'For example: Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d 315 (1931); Ragland v. Anderson, x25
Ky. 141, oo S.W. 865 (19o7); State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724, (1892); id., 83 Wis.
90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892). See also Walter, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts, 37 ILL. L. Ray.
20, 34-35 (1942).
"The N.Y. Court of Appeals refused to entertain a taxpayer's action testing the validity of the Act of
1907 and held that the petitioners were barred by laches in waiting until four general elections had
been held under the Act before challenging its validity. Matter of Reynolds, 2o2 N.Y. 430, 441-42, 96
N.E. 87, 416 (1911). See also Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 61, 102 S.W. 86i (1907).
"°For example: Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 846, x9 N.W.2d 914, 30 Mime. L. REV. 37 (1945); Daly
v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 16o (1941); State ex tel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540,
x59 Pac. 777 (1916).
77 Because population has not grown at the same rate in every county of those states whose legislatures
have failed to reapportion, the most unrepresentative legislatures are now produced by apportionment and
districting statutes, which may have provided a reasonably equitable apportionment when they were
enacted. For a tabulation of the most recent apportionment in each of the fifty states, see NATIoNAT
MuNiciPAL LFAGUE, Co.iaENnimi ON LEGissxrsvE APPoRTIoNMENT (2d ed. 1962).
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character today,78 it was a major cause for the New York Legislature's unrepresenta-
tive character during the inter-war period 9  When a judicial remedy was sought,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the state courts had power neither to
order the election of senators and assemblymen at large until a new apportionment
was enacted nor to enjoin the Secretary of State and local boards of election
from conducting elections for the choice of senators and assemblymen until after
the Legislature reapportioned nor to mandamus the Secretary of State and local
boards to permit a county to elect the increased number of senators and assemblymen
to which that county would be entitled under the most recent census.80
This decision is in conformity with the decisions of the courts in most other states.
State courts have consistently refused to reapportion or redistrict 8' or to order the
legislature to do so.82 Not only have state courts refused to directly compel re-
apportionment or redistricting, but they have also declined to do so indirectly by
refusing to order the state treasurer to withhold legislators' salaries until the legis-
lature reapportions and by refusing to permit the legislature's action or inaction to
be tested in quo warranto proceedings83 Because the state courts have been re-
luctant to grant relief in apportionment and districting cases, allegedly aggrieved
citizens have turned to the federal courts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Colegrove v. Green was a four-to-
three decision. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Reed found that the Court
lacked power to grant relief on the ground that districting was a political question
since Congress has the exclusive power to remedy a legislature's unfairness in
dividing a state into congressional districts. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy
thought not only that jurisdiction existed and should be exercised but also that the
Court could grant equitable relief. The deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, who thought that the Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter but
should dismiss the case for want of equity. Thus, four of the seven Justices thought
8 The seats were apportioned and the state was redistricted after the census of both 1940 and i95o.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 359, amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1944, chs. 530, 725, and 733; N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1953, ch. 893, amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, chs. 2 and 821. Since the state has paid the
U.S. Bureau of the Census approximately $400,0oo to have the 196o citizen population tabulated, it
appears that the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment contemplates proposal of a reapportion-
ment act in x963.
" Csontos, History of Legislative Apportionment in New York 136-203 (manuscript in New York
State Library, 1941); Silverman, The Struggle for Reapportionment in New York State (unpublished
thesis in New York State Library, 1949). As is true today, upstate Republicans and New York City
Democrats were reluctant to give up seats to the rapidly growing suburban areas. See N.Y. Times, March
59, 1962, p. 24, cols. 3-5 (city ed.); id., March 21, 1962, p. 1, cols. 3-4; id., March 21, 1962, p. 30, cols.
6-8; id., March 22, 1962, p. 34, cols. 3-4.
"
0Burns v. Flynn, 268 N.Y. 6or, 198 N.E. 424 (1935).
"For example: Romang v. Cordell, 2oo Okla. 369, 243 P.2d 677 (1952); Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala.
441, 51 So.2d 869 (1951); Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 172 P.2d 397 (1946); Jones v. Freeman,
193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1943).
"
5For example: Fergus v. Marks, 321 111 510, 152 N.E. 557, 46 A.L.R. 96o (1926); State ex rel.
Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S.W. 40 (19x2); People v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451 at 475, 40
N.E. 307 (1895). See Annot., 46 A.L.R. 964-66 (1927); Moore, Legislative Apportionment, 1949 WNVs.
L. Rav. 761, 762-63.
. "'For example: People v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, X73 N.E. 750 (1931); Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill.
437, i64 N.E. 665 (1928),
LFGISLATIV REPREsENTATION 429
that the federal courts have jurisdiction in districting cases but that, in the discretion
of the Court, equity jurisdiction should not be exercised. Since four Justices agreed
not to exercise the Court's equity power, they also declined to pass on the question
of whether the fourteenth amendment forbids the kind of geographical discrimina-
tion that is involved in apportionment and districting cases."
Since the segregation cases have so greatly extended the scope of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 5 the strength of the Colegrove
precedent has been repeatedly challenged 8 6 But the Supreme Court has con-
sistently refused to exercise its equity power in apportionment, districting, and related
cases.87 Consequently, in a five-to-three decision, the Michigan Supreme Court
recently argued that the United States Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the
fourteenth amendment does not prohibit a state from establishing legislative districts
which result in substantial inequality of popular representation. Since all courts are
bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States
Constitution, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment
was not violated by an amendment to the Michigan Constitution which permanently
established the state's senatorial districts virtually as they existed in 1925 and which,
therefore, obviated the necessity for reapportionment in accord with the previously
extant constitutional mandate. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanagh argued
that Michigan's permanent senatorial districts violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, because statistical evidence proves that this districting
provision gives greater weight to one elector's vote for state senator than it gives to
another elector's vote cast for state senator in a different district0s
By deciding Gomillion v. Lightfoot 9 on the basis of the fifteenth amendment,
the United States Supreme Court avoided accepting or rejecting Justice Kavanagh's
at 328 U.S. 549 (1946). This suit was brought by three qualified voters who challenged the
constitutionality of the Illinois Law of xgoi dividing the state into congressional districts, which were
alleged to have become unfair by a shift of population and by the Legislature's failure to redistrict. See
Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in Legislative Apportionment, 52 MINN. L. Rav. 617 (1958).
" Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (i954); and
subsequent "equal protection" cases digested under Const. Law 2z4-25 in most recent edition of
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part to 5 U.S. SUP. Cr. DIGsr.
" Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 9oi (D. Minn. 1959); Hartsfield v. Sloane, cert. denied, 357
U.S. 916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1957); Perry v. Folsom, x44 F. Supp.
874 (N.D. Ala. 1957); Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 22o (D. Hawaii 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 256
F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958).
87For example: Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 9x6 (1952);
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (i95o); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v. Barrett,
330 U.S. 804 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (946); Turman v. Duckworth, ibid.
"' Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. r, 104 N.W.2d 63 (I96O), remanded per curiam on basis of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Marion County (Indiana) Superior Court recently held that the
Legislature's failure to reapportion for forty years not only violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment but also violates the Northwest Ordinance's guarantee of "proportionate repre-
sentation of the people in the legislature" as well as the congressional guarantee of "a republican form
of government" made by various Acts of Congress organizing the Indian Territory and admitting Indiana
to the Union. Grills v. Anderson, Cause #S59-6oo, Book 1030, pp. 203-09 (1961); 29 U.S.L. Wa=
2443 (U.S. March 28, 1961).
so 364 U.S. 339 (196o).
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view that gerrymandering is the kind of discriminatory classification which the
fourteenth amendment forbids. In Gomillion, the Court invalidated an Alabama
statute which altered the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee so that ninety-nine per
cent of the city's Negroes were gerrymandered out of the city. The state's affirmative
action-passage of the statute-was held to single out a racial minority and to deprive
that minority of the right to vote in municipal elections in violation of the fifteenth
amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had written the opinion for the quasi-
majority in Colegrove, was careful to distinguish this case from Colegrove on two
grounds: (i) While the petitioners in Colegrove had rested their case on the
fourteenth amendment, Gomillion was decided on the basis of the fifteenth.
(2) The alleged discrimination in Colegrove resulted from the Legislature's failure
to act while Gomillion involved affirmative legislative action. In a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Whittaker argued that Gomillion should have been decided
on the basis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, because
the Legislature's action amounted to unconstitutional segregation °
Citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, a three-judge federal statutory court recently
dismissed a New York apportionment case for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion on the ground that the fourteenth amendment does not cover geographical
discrimination and that the petitioners neither alleged nor proved that the New
York Constitution's apportionment formulae discriminated against Negro voters
(fifteenth amendment) or women voters (nineteenth amendment). Although
Judge Waterman found that Colkgrove was still controlling so that apportionment
and districting questions were still non-justiciable political questions, Judges Levet
and Ryan denied the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction but did dismiss
the complaint both for want of a federal question and for want of equity in the
relief soughtY1
It is difficult to understand how Judges Levet and Ryan were able to find juris-
diction without also finding that the matter set forth in the complaint raised a federal
question. For, as the Supreme Court recently pointed out in the Tennessee appor-
tionment case, jurisdiction depends on the existence of a federal question that is
covered by a jurisdictional statuteY In Baker v. Carr, the petitioners claim that,
among other things, the Tennessee legislature's failure to reapportion since 190
deprives them-as residents of underrepresented Davidson County-of an equal vote
and, therefore, of equal protection of the laws. Since the Civil Rights Act of 1957
oo1d. at 349.
9 1 WMCA Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), vacated and remanded, 370 U.S. 19o
(1962). The petitioners, WMCA et al., sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights
Act, REV. STAT. §§ 1979, 722 (I875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (x958), and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958),
and alleged that the apportionment and districting provisions of the N.Y. Constitution deny them both
due process and equal protection contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
See also Judge Levet's decision and order to convene the three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(x958). WMCA Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 196).
O'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. x86, x98 (1962). A three-judge federal statutory court was convened
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 228r (958), 175 F. Supp. 649 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), and dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint
had failed to state a claim for which there was a feasible remedy. 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. x959).
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expressly gives the federal courts equity jurisdiction in cases arising under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote, 3
since the right to vote includes the right to have one's vote counted fairly,"4 and since
unfair apportionment and districting prevent the votes in underrepresented districts
from being counted fairly,"s the Court found that the subject matter set forth in
the new complaint relates to equal protection, falls under section 1343(3) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, and, consequently, raises a federal question. 8 Therefore,
the Court held that the federal courts have equity jurisdiction over the subject
matter since the allegations, if proved, constitute denial of equal protection of the
laws contrary to the fourteenth amendment.9 7
Like jurisdiction, the appellants' standing in Baker depended on the existence of
a federal question. Since the Supreme Court found that the right asserted falls
within judicial protection under the fourteenth amendment, the Court also found
that the petitioners have legal rights at stake so that they were held to have standing
to maintain the suit and to challenge Tennessee's apportionment and districting
statutes
8
In the New York apportionment case, Judges Levet and Ryan dismissed the
complaint not only for want of a federal question but also for want of equity in the
relief sought. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Baker, justiciability depends
partially on the existence of an equitable remedy for the alleged deprivationY9
Therefore, by holding that Baker presented a justiciable question, 100 the Court tacitly
found that the federal courts are able to grant relief in apportionment and dis-
tricting cases, although Justice Brennan did not go into the matter of possible
remedies. He merely said: "... [W]e have no cause.., to doubt [that] the District
Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are
found....", 1
Presumably, the federal courts cannot enjoin or mandamus a governor or a
legislature or a state supreme court. 12 It would appear, however, that the federal
courts can enjoin election officials from conducting legislative elections in districts
or can mandamus such ministerial officers to conduct legislative elections at large
2s 8 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1958).
:&United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 384
(1915).
-s In Tennessee, for example, Moore County has 3,454 inhabitants and one representative while
Davidson County (Nashville) has 399,743 and six representatives or 66,624 inhabitants per representative.
Consequently, the petitioners in Baker contend that one popular vote cast for representative in Moore
County has more than nineteen times the weight of one popular vote cast for representative in Davidson
County where they reside. This contention is correct, however, only if the ratio between inhabitants and
votes cast for representative is the same in Moore County as in Davidson County. See note 24 supra.
"369 U.S. 186, ig9 (r962). 'T1d. at 204.
islbid. :id. at x98.
15 10 'd. at 237. 'o1 Id. at 198.
""s In 1957, the Supreme Court found a want of equity in the relief sought by the appellants in an
Oklahoma case and affirmed the federal district court's refusal to mandamus the governor to call a
session of the legislature, mandamus the legislature to reapportion, and mandamus the state supreme
court to reapportion if the legislature failed to do so. Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 54x (W.D. Okla.
1956), afl'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
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until a statute providing fair representation is enacted. 0 3 Indeed, thirty years ago,
the United States Supreme Court ordered the election of congressmen at large in
Minnesota, New York, and Missouri.0 4 Since no rural legislator is likely to wish
to entrust his electoral fate to metropolitan voters, passage of a fair apportionment
and districting statute is likely to follow immediately a court order requiring all of
a state's legislators to be elected in the state-at-large. At least, prompt passage of
reapportionment and/or redistricting legislation has followed whenever a court
has ordered or even tacitly threatened to order the election of all legislators at
large 0 5
Justiciability depends not only upon the existence of an equitable remedy but also
upon the case's presenting a justiciable question. In Baker, the Supreme Court held
that a justiciable question was presented since the petitioners claim that Tennessee's
districting statutes disfavor them vis-a'-vis voters in irrationally favored counties and
since the United States Constitution protects a citizen's right to vote against a state's
arbitrary action °0 The Court rejected all of the arguments that had been urged
in support of the proposition that Baker presented a "political" and, therefore, a non-
justiciable question. For example, the Court rejected Tennessee's contention that
since the petitioners might have made a claim under article four, section four, of the
Constitution-the guarantee clause guaranteeing a "republican form of government"
-and since such a claim would have been nonjusticiable, they were also precluded
from seeking judicial relief based on the fourteenth amendment right to equal
protection'0 7 Similarly, the Court found the political-question argument of
Colegrove to be irrelevant in Baker, because the power to decide questions relating
to the apportionment and districting of state legislatures is not vested in a political
branch of the federal government' The Court likewise rejected the contention
that Baker presented a political question on the alleged ground that judicial
standards are insufficiently precise for a court to determine whether the discrimina-
tion involved in apportionment and districting cases is arbitrary and capricious.' 08
"'5Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221, 231 ([900); Work v. McAIcster-Edwards Co., 262 U.S.
200, 208-09 (1923); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 318-19 (930). See also
scores of cases digested under Injunctions, particularly Injunctions 74, 75, 8o, and 85(2) in 8 U.S. Sup. CT.
DIGssr.
... Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (932); Carroll v. Becker,
285 U.S. 380 (1932).
:os Smiley v. Holm, supra note 104, and Carroll v. Becker, supra note 1o4; Abe v. Dyer, 256 F.2d 728
(9th Cir. 1958) reversing Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956); Magraw v. Donovan, z77 F.
Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1959), dismissing 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958), 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn.
1958), 48 NAT'L Civic REV. 415-16 (1959); Hume v. Mahon, i F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932); Asbury
Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. x, x61 A.2d 705 (sg6o); Application of Lamb, 67 N.J. Sup. 39, 169
A.2d 822, 825-26 (i96!); Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, x66 S.E. 105 (1932); Lewis, Legislatlive
Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 7 HAtv. L. REv. 1057, 1oo, 1o87-89 (1958); N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1961, p. 1, col. 2+ (late city ed.).
106369 U.S. I86, 228 (1962). '°7 Id. at 226.
10 Since each house of Congress is the judge of the election and qualification of its own members
(U.S. Cozsr. art. I, § 5), Justice Frankfurter had used a separation-of-powers argument to defer to
Congress-a co-equal branch of the federal government-in the matter of congressional districts. Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (i946).
209 369 U.S. 186, 226 (8962).
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In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of
Tennessee's legislative districts but remanded the cause to the district court to
determine whether Tennessee's legislative districts actually do violate the fourteenth
amendment. Since the district court has already found that the Tennessee Legis-
lature's failure to reapportion violates the fourteenth amendment,"10 the district
court presumably will translate this earlier finding into a judicial ruling. It is
quite possible, although unlikely, that the Supreme Court may reverse such a
district-court decision-either on the ground that there is a rational explanation
for these inequalities of representation so that they do not constitute the kind of
"invidious discrimination" which the fourteenth amendment forbids"' or on the
ground that Tennessee's districts have become unfair not through affirmative legis-
lative action but only through the passage of time." 2 If the Supreme Court should
overrule the district court's next decision in Baker on the latter ground, it does not
necessarily follow that the Supreme Court will dismiss the New York case, for
the New York apportionment formulae were consciously designed to discriminate
against voters in New York and Kings counties." 3
11o 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
... Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan merely spoke of "arbitrary and capricious" districting as
violating the United States Constitution but did not define "arbitrary and capricious." In his concurring
opinion, Justice Clark argued that numerical equality of representation is not required and that in-
equality is not unconstitutional if there is a rational explanation for these inequalities. Clark contended,
however, that the magnitude and frequency of the inequalities in Tennessee admit of no rational policy
whatever. 369 U.S. 186, 254. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, expressly withheld his views on
the merits. Id. at 266. In their dissents, Justice Harlan argued that Tennessee's districts were not
sufficiently '"irrational" to be unconstitutional (id. at 334"40) while Justice Frankfurter offered an
historical defense for basing representation on geographic subdivisions with little or no regard for popu-
lation. Id. at 293-97, 300-30.
... See notes 76 and 89 supra.
1133 N.Y. CoNsMnrMoNA. CONVEI MON, op. cit. supra note 7, at roo8-o9, 1178, zx82; 4 id. at zo-zi,
87; and elsewhere throughout the debates of New York State's Constitutional Convention of 1894.
